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Resumo
O artigo revisita a questão da sustentabilidade da política fiscal brasileira analisando as 
respostas fiscais do governo a alterações na razão dívida-PIB, com vistas a avaliar qual 
tem sido a resposta fiscal média do governo brasileiro, e como essa resposta fiscal tem 
variado ao longo do tempo. Utilizando dados mensais e controlando para variações 
no produto e participação relativa de títulos indexados, estimamos funções de reação 
sequenciais com uma janela móvel de 12 observações. Os resultados indicam que a 
política fiscal no período foi sustentável, com uma resposta fiscal média do governo 
consolidado de 0.096 pontos percentuais no superávit primário para um aumento de 
um ponto percentual na relação dívida-PIB. Verificamos ainda que a função de reação 
tornou-se mais estável, porém menos sensível a aumentos da relação dívida/PIB após 
o ano de 2000 e assumiu uma tendência declinante após 2006.  
Palavras-Chave
Função de reação fiscal. Sustentabilidade fiscal. Brasil.
Abstract
This paper estimates a fiscal reaction function for Brazil and investigates how the 
government´s fiscal reaction has changed over time when controlling for cyclical va-
riations in output and the relative participation of indexed debt. Using monthly data 
since 1991, we estimate a rolling reaction function with a one observation step and a 
sample-window of 12 observations. Our results indicate that the government´s fiscal 
response has been such that a one percent increase in the debt-GDP ratio can be asso-
ciated to an average increase in the primary surplus of approximately 0.096% over GDP 
or 9.6 basis points; the government´s fiscal reaction has become more stable but less 
responsive to the debt-income level after 2000 and assumed a declining trend after 2006. 
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1. Introduction
Most of the applied literature on fiscal sustainability are based on 
the econometric implications of a government following an intertem-
porally balanced budget constraint. Compliance or not to the budget 
constraint is usually tested as a cointegrating relationship between 
revenues and interest-inclusive government expenditures or, equi-
valently, as a mean-reverting process for the debt-GDP ratio series. 
Articles by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1991), 
Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), 
Uctum and Wickens (2000), amongst others, have all analyzed sus-
tainability in this fashion. For Brazil, following the international li-
terature, Rocha (1995), Tanner (1995), Luporini (2000), Issler and 
Lima (2000), all tested sustainability through the econometric pro-
perties of the debt, revenue and expenditure series, supporting sus-
tainability. More recently, Bicalho (2005) finded that Brazilian fiscal 
policy was sustainable for the period 1997-2004, while Giambiagi 
and Ronci (2004) concluded for an unsustainable policy between 
1995 and 2002. Using a probabilistic approach, Mendoza and Oviedo 
(2004), Garcia and Rigobon (2004), Tanner and Samake (2008), and 
Luporini and Licha (2009) also gave evidence of a fiscally sustainable 
public debt for Brazil.  
Bohn (2007) shows, however, that an intertemporally balanced bud-
get imposes very weak econometric restriction on the series of debt 
or revenues and expenditures.  In proving his bold statements, Bohn 
shows how a broader class of stochastic processes may comply with an 
intertemporally balanced budget and yet violate mostly used condi-
tions for sustainability, namely stationarity and cointegration. A more 
promising approach would be, according to the author, analyzing fis-
cal sustainability through a fiscal reaction function.  Earlier, Uctum, 
Thurston and Uctum (2006) applied the usual econometric implica-
tions of an intertemporally balanced budget (mainly unit root tests) to 
G7 and some Asian and Latin American countries (but not Brazil) and 
showed how sensitive these results could be to the inclusion (or not) 
of structural breaks in the tendency of the debt and deficit series, 
and how fiscal reaction functions could be used as a more appropriate 
instrument to analyze fiscal sustainability.
A fiscal reaction function checks whether the government s´ beha-
vior has been sufficiently “responsive” to increments in the debt. 
 Sustainability of Brazilian fiscal policy, once again: corrective policy response over time    439
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.45, n.2, p.437-458, abr.-jun. 2015
Luporini (2002),  De Mello (2005), Lima and Simonassi (2005), 
and more recently,  Mendonça , Santos and Sachsida (2009) and 
Simonassi (2013) have estimated fiscal reaction functions for Brazil. 
Mendonça, Santos and Sachsida, used a Markov switching model 
over the period 1995-2007 and found that Brazilian fiscal policy 
was more responsive to accumulating debt prior to the year 2000. 
Simonassi (2013) identifies two endogenous breaks on the Brazilian 
fiscal reaction function, in 1994 and in 2003. This paper also esti-
mates a fiscal reaction function for Brazil, but we further investigate 
the evolution of the fiscal reaction function, analyzing how the go-
vernment s´ fiscal reaction has changed over time when controlling 
for cyclical variations in output and the relative participation of floa-
ting rate indexed debt. By analyzing the fiscal response through time 
using a rolling sample window of 12 months, we hope to identify 
changes in the fiscal behavior of Brazilian authorities that may not 
be readily captured by the empirical approaches previously used for 
Brazilian data.  Specifically, we pose ourselves two questions:
a) What has been the average fiscal response of the Brazilian 
government to variations in its public debt?
b)     How has the Brazilian fiscal response behaved over time? 
Our results indicate that the government s´ fiscal response has been 
such that a 1 percent increase in the debt-GDP ratio can be associa-
ted to an average increase in the primary surplus of approximately 
0.096% over GDP or 9.6 basis points, the government s´ fiscal reac-
tion has become more stable but less responsive to the debt-income 
level after 2000 and assumed a declining trend after 2006.  
More recently, the Treasury has issued securities to transfer resour-
ces to federal banks in order to foster their capacity to offer credit 
lines to infrastructure and housing projects. Although these opera-
tions do not alter the net liability position of the consolidated public 
sector, they have increased the gross debt-income ratio.  A simple 
estimation of the fiscal reaction function over the period 2001:01 
through 2013:08 delivered a fiscal parameter 1.26 basis points lower 
for the response to the gross debt-income ratio.  Although the recent 
period deserves a more detailed analysis, the results suggest a diffe-
rent behavior of the fiscal reaction function to the gross measure of 
the government debt. 
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The article is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the gover-
nment s´ budget constraint, the problems for assessing fiscal sus-
tainability and present the fiscal reaction function. The results for 
the corrective policy responses by the Brazilian government and its 
evolution through time are presented in section 3.  Section 4 con-
cludes the article.
2. The government s´ budget constraint and Bohn s´ fiscal reaction 
function
The theory of government finance states that a fiscal policy is fis-
cally sustainable when the government follows an intertemporally 
balanced budget. In the absence of monetary financing and shocks, 
the government’s budget constraint in real terms and as a ratio to 
income can be written as:
                             (1)
where,
b  is the par value of the stock of government debt;
g and t are net of interest government expenditures and tax re-
venue, respectively;
r is the ex post after-tax real rate of interest;
k is the growth rate of income.
As the budget constraint above indicates, the evolution of the 
debt-income ratio depends mainly on the primary deficit (g – t) and 
on the product of the accumulated debt-income ratio and the diffe-
rence between the rate of interest paid on government’s securities 
and the growth rate of the economy. If the difference is positive, the 
government needs a primary surplus to keep the debt/income ratio 
from rising; if it is negative, the debt/income ratio may be stable 
even in the presence of some level of primary deficit.1
1  In fact, the budget constraint is not binding when k is greater than r. 
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Assuming no growth and a constant interest rate just for mathema-
tical simplicity, applying forward substitution to the budget cons-
traint, taking expectations as of time t and applying the limit gives 
the well-known no-Ponzi scheme condition:  
                                                   (2)
As we know, the no-Ponzi condition indicates that the government 
is neither borrowing without collateral nor accumulating excess re-
venues that could be used to improve general welfare. Sustainability 
thus requires that the government debt be offset by expected future 
primary surpluses of equal present-value.  
Empirically, the no-Ponzi condition has been tested in one of two 
ways: as a cointegrating relationship between revenues and interest 
inclusive government expenditures or, equivalently, as a mean-rever-
ting process for the debt/income ratio series [Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush 
(1991), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Uctum and Wickens (2000), 
amongst others].2  
In a stochastic environment, the real return on government bonds 
commonly used as a discount rate will actually depend on how 
the overall level of government debt is distributed across states of 
nature. 3  
Bohn (2007) argues that, although mathematically correct, the 
results used in most empirical work on sustainability restrict the 
class of admissible alternative stochastic processes “in a way that 
rules out higher-order integration” [Bohn, (2007) p. 1838].  In fact, 
the author shows that if the debt series is integrated of any finite 
order,  for any finite m ≥ 0 , it will satisfy the transversality 
or no-Ponzi condition (equation 2) as long as the real interest rate 
(net of growth rate in the case above) is positive. This implies that 
any finite order of integration is compatible with the intertemporal 
2 For analysis of the Brazilian case, see for example Rocha (1995), Tanner (1995), Issler and 
Lima (1997), Luporini (2000).   For a probabilistic treatment of the sustainability of the 
Brazilian public debt see Mendoza and Oviedo (2004), Tanner and Samake (2008), and 
Luporini and Licha (2009).  
3 See Bohn (1995) and (2005) for a detailed discussion of this point. 
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budget constraint. This is so because the discounting factor in (2) is 
exponential in n while the conditional expectation of an integrated 
variable of  order m will be, at most, a polynomial of order m on the 
time horizon n. As exponential growth is known to dominate poly-
nomial growth of any order, the discount factor in (2) will asymp-
totically dominate the expected value of debt. As a result, with a 
positive real (net of growth) interest rate, the discount factor will 
tend to zero as n rises and the intertemporal budget constraint will 
be satisfied for any order of integration of the debt series. 
Empirically his proposition means that one should not conclude for 
compliance or not to the no-Ponzi condition based on unit root and 
cointegration tests.  Yet, a non-stationary debt means that the series 
does not have an upper bound, which clearly has economic impli-
cations for the government s´ credibility and its debt management 
conditions.  For instance, Greenlaw, Hamilton, Hooper and Mishkin 
(2013) have recently developed a model to show how high debt/GDP 
levels can make governments vulnerable to adverse feedback effects 
from the higher interest rates required by security holders. 
 
2.1. The fiscal reaction function
Given the possible shortcomings of the unit root and cointegration 
sustainability tests, Bohn (1998, 2005) thus proposes a simple linear 
fiscal reaction function that ensures sustainability in a variety of 
stochastic situations. The function consists of searching for evidence 
of corrective action by the government in response to changes in its 
debt-income ratio: 
             (3)
where, st and bt-1  stand for the primary surplus and debt-income 
ratios. The “error term”  is bounded as a share of income and re-
presents other determinants of fiscal surplus.
The main hypothesis tested when estimating a fiscal reaction 
function is that the government has been responding to increases in 
its debt by adjusting its primary surplus or, equivalently, reducing its 
deficit. A strictly positive coefficient on bt-1 implies that a negative 
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shock that results in an increase in the debt-income ratio, regardless 
of its nature, leads eventually to an increase in the primary surplus, 
ensuring compliance to an intertemporal budget constraint and thus 
fiscal sustainability.
In order to understand the relationship between the fiscal reaction 
function and the government s´ budget constraint, we may rewrite 
(1) as:
            (4)
where  st =  tt – gt  defines the primary surplus. Combining equation 
(4) with the reaction function (3), we may establish a relationship 
between the government s´ fiscal policy and the behavior of the de-
bt-income ratio:
             (5)
The conditions for debt management depend on what is expected for 
the debt/income ratio over time. Assuming particular values for the 
real interest rate (rt = r*) and the economy s´ growth rate (kt = k*) 
and taking expectations as of time t on (5):
                                              (5')
That is, economic agents will expect the debt-income ratio to 
rise compared to the previous observed debt-income ratio when 
, implying .  On the other hand, when 
, implying , agents will expect the 
debt-income ratio to decline in relation to the previous observed le-
vel, improving conditions for debt management. Stabilizing expecta-
tions about the debt-income ratio requires that  or 
 and fiscal policy must be such that the fiscal response 
to a debt increment has to be greater, on average, than the real rate 
at which the debt-income itself is growing (r – k).  In other words, 
the fiscal reaction has to overcome the positive difference between 
the real rate of return paid on government securities and the eco-
nomy s´ growth rate.4 
4 This is provided that the economy is operating on the dynamically efficient region.  In fact, 
if this is not the case (r < k, with probability one), the government s´ budget is not binding 
and the fiscal reaction would be irrelevant.
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3. Corrective policy responses by the Brazilian government
Fiscal sustainability will be analyzed by the relationship between 
the primary surplus and the debt-income ratio for the consolidated 
public sector. The evolution of these data for Brazil is presented in 
Figure 1. 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
20
30
40
50
60
70
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Surplus
Debt
Primary Surplus and Net Debt (% of GDP), 1991- 2011
Consolidated Public Sector
Source: Central Bank of Brazil
The primary result indicates surpluses for most of the period ana-
lyzed. Between 1991 and the Real Plan of June 1994, the primary 
result averaged 2.9% of GDP but the fiscal stance deteriorated be-
tween 1995 and 1998.  As prices stabilized after 1994, the possibil-
ity of reducing real government expenditures through inflation to 
balance the budget was no longer possible and bad budget practices 
were uncovered. Until 1994, because revenues were price-indexed 
while expenditures were not, simply delaying payments could help 
improving the budget. Also during this period, the so-called hid-
den liabilities began to be properly included in the government s´ 
accounts, contributing to the deterioration of its fiscal stance. 
At the end of 1998, the crawling peg exchange rate system used 
to support domestic prices came under attack.  Facing an external 
and fiscal crisis, the government floated the currency in 1999 and 
implemented institutional changes, most importantly, it approved 
the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000. Although previous 
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legislation (Complementary Laws 82/95 and 96/99, known as “Lei 
Camata” I and II, respectively), already established ceilings on go-
vernment payroll (60% of net revenues), the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law extended the purposes of the “Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias” 
(LDO), which now includes detailed fiscal amendments: “Anexo de 
Metas Fiscais” and “Anexo de Riscos Fiscais”.  The “Anexos” establish 
targets for the primary surplus and net debt of the consolidated pu-
blic sector, based on expected figures for the growth rate of GDP, 
nominal interest rates and the Real/US Dollar exchange rate for the 
current and two subsequent fiscal years, and establish criteria to 
limit expenditures in the event of fiscal revenues being lower than 
originally expected so that fiscal equilibrium can be guaranteed.
That is, with the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), the budget pro-
posed annually by the government (federal and local) in the “Lei 
Orçamentária Anual” (LOA) must follow not only the priorities 
established by the “Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias” (LDO), but 
also the fiscal limits established by the LRF. This represented a 
change in the fiscal regime and resulted in a persistent downward 
trend for the debt/GDP level since 2002.  
This benign evolution of the debt-income level was temporarily in-
terrupted by the international crisis of 2008.  The effects of the 
crisis on the overall growth rate of Brazil were relatively mild un-
til 2011, in spite of the poor performance of the industrial sector, 
as  active fiscal policy by the federal government kept consumption 
afloat. 
In order to assess fiscal sustainability, we will search for a systematic 
relationship between the primary surplus and the debt-income ratio 
by estimating the following regression equation:
                                (6)
where Xjt is a set of j = 2,…,m control variables that may also influen-
ce the government s´ surplus, such as the business cycle and debt 
management actions by the Treasury.   
Tax smoothing considerations suggests that budget deficits might 
be higher than normal during economic downturns. As indicated by 
Barro (1979), the deadweight loss from taxation would be minimized 
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when the government acts counter-cyclically increasing its budget 
deficits during economic recessions while saving up during periods 
of economic growth. Empirically, a measure of the economic cycle 
(ygap) is added to the fiscal reaction function as a control variable. 
We should expect a positive coefficient if the government follows a 
tax smoothing policy. 
A second control variable (index) used in the estimations is the per-
centage of government securities formally indexed to the baseline 
interest rate, the Selic rate.  For a given debt-income level, the higher 
the relative participation of indexed securities in the total debt, the 
lower the market s´ appetite for securities sold at a discount (nominal 
securities). This would in turn require a higher fiscal response by the 
government in order to increase fiscal credibility and improve the 
conditions for debt management. 
For the fiscal policy, as previously discussed, the government may be 
considered fiscally sustainable if the coefficient on the debt-income 
ratio, , is strictly positive. We will first investigate the average fiscal 
response followed by the Brazilian government during the period 
and then we will investigate how it has changed over time. A time-
varying fiscal response has the advantage of allowing for possible 
changes in fiscal regime without having to establish, endogenously 
or exogenously, specific periods for structural breaks. 
The method of estimation depends on the stochastic nature of the 
data. The output gap, calculated as deviations of output from a ho-
drick-prescott filter, and the relative participation of indexed securi-
ties on total debt are stationary by construction.  Results for unit 
root tests are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Unit Root and Stationarity Tests a/  
Variable ADF b/ ADF-GLS KPSS
st I(1) I(1) I(0)
bt I(1) I(1) I(1)
a/ ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and ADF-GLS (Generalized Augmented Dickey-fuller 
Test); KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992, stationarity test).   
 
b/ All testes included only a constant as exogenous variable, as the graphs do not indicate 
the presence of deterministic trends in the series [Hayashi, 2000];  I(1) and I(0) indicate 
integration of order 1 (presence of a stochastic trend or unit root) or of order zero (stationary 
or absence of a unit root).    
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The unit root tests indicate that both the primary surplus and the net 
public debt may have stochastic trends (are integrated of order 1). As 
such, the search for a sustainable relationship between the primary 
surplus and the public debt will rely on a possible cointegrating vector 
relating these two fiscal variables. Cointegration tests are presented 
in Table 2.
Table 2:  Cointegration tests a/
Trace Statistic p-value b/ Max Eigen Statistic p-value b/
None 74.645* 0 74.170* 0
At most 1 0,475 0,554 0,475 0,554
a/ s and b endogenous, allowing for a constant term in the cointegrating vector and VAR. 
No exogenous variables included to control for possible bias in the results as critical values 
assume no exogenous variables.
b/ MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) p-values, Eviews- version 7.1.
As Table 2 indicates, both the trace and maximum eigenvalue cointe-
gration tests reject the null of no cointegration and do not reject the 
presence of one cointegrating relation between the primary surplus 
and the debt-income ratio. 
When the variables are cointegrated, the coefficients may be esti-
mated using a system of equations (vector error correction model 
proposed by Johansen, 1991) or a single equation model (Banerjee, 
Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry, 1993). Johansen s´ method departs 
from a vector auto regression system (VAR) and jointly estimates 
both the cointegrating vector (the long run relation between the va-
riables) and the parameters of the error correction vector (temporary 
deviations from the long run relation); as such, Johansen s´ method 
is asymptotically more efficient than single equation methods.  But 
VAR systems are known for their sensitivity to alternative specifi-
cation and instability in finite samples, which makes single equation 
models more attractive in finite sample contexts.   
Here, we are interested in the long-term relation between primary 
surpluses and debt. Hamilton (1994) shows that if the variables are 
cointegrated, the cointegrating vector can be consistently estimated 
by OLS and, as long as the explanatory variables are weakly exoge-
nous, standard t or F statistics may be used to test hypothesis about 
the cointegrating vector.  
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a)   The average fiscal response of the Brazilian government
As discussed previously, a fiscally sustainable policy implies a posi-
tive coefficient on the debt-income ratio indicating corrective mea-
sures in the primary surplus. What has been the average fiscal res-
ponse by the Brazilian government to variations in the debt-income 
ratio over the period 1991 through 2011? 
To answer this question we estimate the cointegrating vector implied 
by equation (6) using both, the Johansen s´ method (the vector error 
correction model), and the uniequational method (results not repor-
ted).  The results for the cointegrating vector are reported in Table 
3 below. The results for the long-run relationship between the fiscal 
variables as shown in the cointegrating equation ( ) indica-
te a positive and systematic response of the primary surplus to the 
debt-income ratio, suggesting a sustainable fiscal policy.  According 
to Models I and II, a 1 percent increase in the debt-GDP ratio can be 
associated with an average increase in the primary surplus of appro-
ximately 0.09% of GDP. Coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. 
In Model III, the percentage of government securities formally in-
dexed to the baseline interest rate, (index), is included as a control 
variable.   As discussed earlier, the higher the relative participation 
of indexed securities, the lower the market s´ willingness to hold 
nominal securities, and the higher should be the government s´ fiscal 
response.  Results for Model III do not suggest that indexed securi-
ties have been important for the fiscal reaction function or to the 
short-term dynamics of the primary surplus as a ratio to income as 
the cointegration coefficient, as well as the coefficient on the index 
variable, are not statistically significant.
  
The short-term dynamics of the primary surplus as a ratio to 
income is reported in the second part of Table 3. We observe that 
for all Models, the coefficient on the error correction term (see 
Cointegrating. Eq.) is negative and statistically significant in the 
primary surplus equation.  This indicates that temporary devia-
tions from the long-term surplus-debt relationship are compensated 
by changes in the primary surplus. That is, when shocks imply a 
primary surplus above the debt-income ratio as determined by the 
long-term  coefficient  ( ), there is a negative change in the 
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primary surplus in the next period so that its value tends to return 
to its long term estimated equilibrium.  
Similarly, if a shock induces a surplus below the long-term rela-
tionship with the debt-income ratio, there will be a compensating 
positive change in the surplus-income ratio. In fact, one percentage 
point deviation from the estimated long-term surplus-debt relation 
induces, approximately, a 0.05 percentage point correction in the 
primary surplus. Cyclical variations in output (Models II and III) 
and the relative participation of indexed securities (Model III) were 
not statistically significant. 
Table 3: Vector Error Correction Estimates a/d/
Model I Model II Model III
Cointegrating Eq: 
st-1 1 1 1
bt-1 -0.092847* -0.096165* -0.075523
(0.04013)  (0.04133)  (0.05143)
[-2.31360] [-2.32701] [-1.46857]
Error Correction Dst Dbt Dst Dbt Dst Dbt
Cointegrating Eq: -0.048659* -0.133100* -0.049856* -0.122097* -0.045354* -0.128173*
 (0.01861)  (0.04953)  (0.01871)  (0.04947)  (0.01896)  (0.04995)
[-2.61424] [-2.68729] [-2.66463] [-2.46790] [-2.39193] [-2.56611]
Dst-1 -0,069938 0,144979 -0.068746  0.126713 -0.070076  0.126410
 (0.05238)  (0.13938)  (0.05257)  (0.13902)  (0.05305)  (0.13975)
[-1.33520] [ 1.04015] [-1.30761] [ 0.91150] [-1.32090] [ 0.90454]
Dbt-1 0,021759 -0,023568  0.022026 -0.030477  0.023718 -0.031775
 (0.02475)  (0.06587)  (0.02484)  (0.06569)  (0.02487)  (0.06551)
[ 0.87901] [-0.35780] [ 0.88655] [-0.46392] [ 0.95369] [-0.48502]
                                      C  0.002143 -0.016781  0.001940 -0.013979 -0.021763 -0.068936
 (0.02520)  (0.06705)  (0.02524)  (0.06674)  (0.05767)  (0.15191)
[ 0.08504] [-0.25028] [ 0.07688] [-0.20945] [-0.37738] [-0.45378]
YGAP  0.001318 -0.016548  0.001148 -0.016640
 (0.00337)  (0.00891)  (0.00339)  (0.00893)
[ 0.39121] [-1.85792] [ 0.33864] [-1.86406]
Index  0.000615  0.001422
 (0.00135)  (0.00355)
[ 0.45589] [ 0.40028]
 Adj. R-squared  0.031473  0.063020  0.028594  0.072052  0.021181  0.072008
 F-statistic  2.310671  3.712772  2.017648  3.684372  1.654605  3.347260
 Det. resid cov. (dof adj.)  0.160144  0.159168  0.160364
 Log likelihood -459.9523 -458.1772 -458.0507
 Akaike info criterion  3.917303  3.919154  3.934574
 Schwarz criterion  4.147299  4.177899  4.222068
Observations 243 243 243
LM(12), p-values c/ 0,5817 0,6512 0,6375
White Test, p-values 0,4976 0,5995 0.0005*
a/ Estimation assumed a constant term in the VAR system; Dummies  (2001m12, 2002m11, 
1991m12) included to control for Central Bank primary surplus series.(*)  Indicates 
significance at the 5% level, asymptotic critical value of 1.96.      
b/  Null of no serial correlation up to lag 12.
c/  Null of  homocedasticity, no cross-terms.      
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b)   Fiscal Reaction Over Time
The results above indicated that a 1 percent increase in the 
debt-GDP ratio can be associated with an average increase in the 
primary surplus of approximately 0.09% of GDP. But how has the 
fiscal response changed over the period analyzed? 
In order to answer this question, we estimate a rolling regression 
equation (6) with a one observation step and a sample-window of 12 
observations. Equation (6) involves the primary surplus and the debt
-income ratios (both with stochastic trends) and stationary variables 
used as controls.  As indicated in Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) 
and Banerjee et. alli (1993), regressions involving a set of cointegra-
ted variables along with stationary variables may be  consistently 
estimated by OLS and inference on the coefficients can be made 
based on standard t tests (Hamilton, 1994).5 The evolution of the 
fiscal response by the Brazilian government is displayed in Figure 2. 
The values for the fiscal parameter observed in the graph repre-
sent the rolling regression coefficients over a 12-month window, so 
that each point estimated actually reflects the fiscal response for 
the 12-month period ahead.  We observe a high variation of the 
fiscal parameter during the high inflation period (1991:01 through 
1994:06) and the collapse of the crawling-peg regime in January of 
1999.  Along with the fiscal efforts implemented by the government 
after 1999 and the approval the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000, 
we observe an improvement in the fiscal response to debt.  
Fiscal reaction becomes weaker but relatively stable after 2001; it 
increases again during 2005 and reaches a high 0.4% for the point 
estimated for September of that year, reflecting the fiscal policy 
of 2006. After that, the fiscal parameter became more volatile and 
assumed a declining trend.  There is indication of a change in the fis-
cal regime after 2000. These results are in line with those obtained 
by de Mello (2005) and by Mendonça, Santos and Sachsida (2009). 
More recently, using dummy variables in the analysis of fiscal reac-
tion functions for Brazil, Simonassi (2013) estimates two probable 
structural breaks, in may/1994 and February/2003.6 
5 The program for the rolling regressions is available from the authors uppon request (Eviews 7.1).
6 In fact, we adjusted the sample to the one used by Simonassi (2013) and obtained similar 
coefficients for the fiscal reaction function.
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As previously discussed, stabilizing the debt-income ratio requires 
that the fiscal reaction parameter overcome the positive difference 
between the real rate of return paid on government securities and the 
economy s´ growth rate. Obtaining an empirical counterpart of the 
rate paid on government debt is not easy, as it reflects the distribution 
of securities over different maturities and indexation clauses.  Ideally, 
this rate should also be net of taxes, complicating even more an 
empirical measurement. But, in order to have a rough idea about the 
relationship between the fiscal parameter and (r – k), we consider a 
real interest rate of about 2% and a growth rate of 1,5%. Debt would 
then increase, ceteris paribus, at 0.5% over GDP.  According to the 
estimations, for an increase of debt by 1% of GDP (or, equivalently, 
one percentage point over GDP), the primary surplus has responded, 
on average, by 0.09% of GDP and we may conclude that the average 
fiscal reaction has been 0.49 percentage points short of the necessary 
for stabilizing debt-income ratio expectations. That is, although a 
strictly positive fiscal reaction is indicative of a sustainable fiscal 
policy, the average fiscal reaction may not be sufficient to overturn 
expectations of a higher debt-income ratio in the near future. 
3.1   Recent fiscal response and gross public debt
We used data for the net government debt to estimate the fiscal 
reaction function.  Recently, the Brazilian government has issued se-
curities to transfer resources to the federal owned banks (mainly the 
development bank, BNDES) in order to foster their capacity to offer 
credit lines to much needed housing and infrastructure projects.   As 
these operations do not alter the short term net liability position of 
the consolidated public sector or its net debt, some analysts have 
argued that the gross measure of the debt should now be used to 
analyze the fiscal stance of the government.  In fact, as shown be-
low (Figure 3), we observe that both measures of debt followed the 
same declining trend until the international crisis of 2008.  After 
2009, gross debt assumes a different pattern while the net measure 
resumes its steady decline.  
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A simple (OLS) estimation of the fiscal reaction function to the 
gross (standard) measure of the debt-income ratio suggests a weaker 
reaction parameter for the gross debt measure:7
s t  = -0.0237 + 0.0469 b t-1 
GROSS   + 0.1155 ygap t-1
Prob (tHAC_statistic)                      (0.0125)                             (0.0163)
Adjusted R2 = 0.165   
Prob (F-statistic) = 0.000005
s t  = 0.4405 + 0.0595 b t-1
NET  + 0.1003 ygap t-1
Prob (tHAC_statistic)                    (0.0000)                        (0.0267)
Adjusted R2 = 0.398    
Prob (F-statistic) = 0.000000
7 Ordinary Least Squares estimation using monthly data from 2003m02 through 2013m09. 
Heterocedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) t values based on the Newey-
West variance-covariance matrix.  Associated  p-values in parenthesis indicate statistically 
significant coefficients for debt and the output gap at the 5% confidence level.
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While the average fiscal response to the net measure of the debt 
was 5.95 basis points over GDP, the average response to the gross 
measure, for the same period, was 1.26 basis points lower or 4.69. 
Although the recent period deserves a more detailed analysis, the 
results suggest a different behavior of the fiscal reaction function to 
the gross measure of the government debt. 
4. Final remarks
Fiscal targets have become an important part of the Brazilian go-
vernment s´ budgetary process and accountability.  In this paper, we 
provided estimates of the fiscal reaction function of the Brazilian 
government and we present evidence of a fiscally sustainable policy 
defined as a (strictly) positive response of the primary surplus to 
increases in the debt-income level. Using monthly data, the paper 
analyses both the average fiscal response of the primary surplus to 
variations of the government public debt and the evolution of the 
fiscal reaction function through time, controlling for cyclical varia-
tions in output and the relative participation of floating rate indexed 
debt. A time-varying fiscal response has the advantage of allowing 
for possible changes in fiscal regime without having to establish, 
endogenously or exogenously, specific periods for possible structural 
breaks.  
Specifically, we answered two questions:
a) what has been the average fiscal response of the Brazilian 
government to variations in its public debt?  And, 
b) how has the Brazilian fiscal response behaved over time? 
According to our results, the government s´ policy has been fiscally 
sustainable over the period analyzed: a one percent increase in the 
debt-GDP ratio has been associated with an average increase in the 
primary surplus of approximately 0.096% over GDP or 9.6 basis 
points.   
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Analyzing the evolution of the fiscal response through time, we find 
that the policy became more stable after the year 2000, but less 
responsive to the debt-income level.  Fiscal response seems to have 
assumed a declining trend after 2006. Our results are in line with 
those previously obtained by the literature.  
More recently, the Brazilian government has issued securities to 
transfer resources to the federal owned banks in order to foster 
their capacity to offer credit lines to much needed housing and in-
frastructure projects. These operations do not alter the short term 
net liability position of the consolidated public sector or its net debt, 
but alter the gross measure of the government debt. A simple esti-
mation of the fiscal reaction function suggests that the recent fiscal 
response has been, on average, weaker when the gross measure of the 
debt is used in the estimations. If this result resists a more detailed 
analysis, it will imply that fiscal policy has been more expansionary 
than the net debt measure might suggest. One of the consequences 
is that a weak fiscal response to a relatively high (gross) debt-income 
level, in a context of rising inflationary expectations and low output 
growth, significantly reduces the choices available to the monetary 
authorities and further complicates a future fiscal consolidation plan. 
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Appendix: 
DATA SET:  
Monthly data, 1991:01 – 2013:08. 
S : Surplus is the negative of the Borrowing Requirements of the Public Sector (% of 
GDP) – Resultado Primário 
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil, series 17127 and 5364.  
 
17127 - NFSP sem desvalorização cambial (% PIB) - Fluxo mensal corrente - Resultado 
primário - Total –  
Setor público consolidado com Petrobras - % 
 
5364 - NFSP sem desvalorização cambial (% PIB) - Fluxo mensal corrente - Resultado 
primário - Total –  
Setor público consolidado - % 
 
B: Net Public Debt of the Consolidated Public Sector (% of GDP), Gross general 
government debt (% GDP) 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, series 4513, 4537 and 13762. 
 
4513 – Net publicdebt (% GDP) - Total – Consolidated public sector - % 
 
4537 - Gross general government debt (% GDP) - Method used until 2007 - % 
 
13762 - Gross general government debt (% GDP) - Method used since 2008 - % 
 
Ygap: Deviations from a hendrick-prescott filter applied to industrial production 
index (quantum) 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, 11064 
 
Index: Relative participation of interest Indexed federal securities 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, via Ipeadata (www.ipeadata.gov.br), series 
 
Títulos - federais - indexados à Over / Selic - fim período - (%) –  
Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim, Seção Finanças Públicas (BCB Boletim/F. Públ.) - 
BM12_TPFOVER12 
 
Títulos - federais - indexados à Over / Selic - mercado aberto - fim período - (%) –  
Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim, Seção Finanças Públicas (BCB Boletim/F. Públ.) - 
BM12_TPFOVERMA12 
 
R: Real interest rate (Selic – IPCA inflation) 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, via 
Ipeadata (www.ipeadata.gov.br), series 
 
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.45, n.2, p.437-458, abr.-jun. 2015
458                                                                                                            Viviane Luporini
Taxa de juros - Over / Selic - (% a.m.) - Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim,  
Seção mercado financeiro e de capitais (BCB Boletim/M. Finan.) - BM12_
TJOVER12 
Inflação - IPCA - (% a.m.) - Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística,  
Sistema Nacional de Índices de Preços ao Consumidor (IBGE/SNIPC) - PRECOS12_
IPCAG12 
 
IBC-Br: Economic Activity Index (Central Bank) 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, via Ipeadata (www.ipeadata.gov.br), series 
 
Índice de Atividade Econômica do Banco Central (IBC-Br) - dessazonalizado 
(2002=100) – 
- Banco Central do Brasil, Sistema Gerenciador de Séries Temporais (BCB outras/
SGS) - SGS12_IBCBRDESSAZ12 
